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Abstract—The acceptance of autonomous vehicles is dependent on the rigorous assessment of their safety. Furthermore, the
commercial viability of AV programs depends on the ability to estimate the time and resources required to achieve desired safety levels.
Naive approaches to estimating the reliability and safety levels of autonomous vehicles under development are will require infeasible
amounts of testing of a static vehicle configuration. To permit both the estimation of current safety, and make predictions about the
reliability of future systems, I propose the use of a standard tool for modelling the reliability of evolving software systems, software
reliability growth models (SRGMs).
Publicly available data from Californian public-road testing of two autonomous vehicle systems is modelled using two of the best-known
SRGMs. The ability of the models to accurately estimate current relibility, as well as for current testing data to predict reliability in the
future after additional testing, is evaluated. One of the models, the Musa-Okumoto model, appears to be a good estimator and a
reasonable predictor.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE safety and reliability of autonomous vehicles (AVs),which are currently under development by a wide
variety of companies, is of significant public importance.
Regulators in many jurisdictions are currently defining
regulatory frameworks for the approval of autonomous
vehicles to operate on public roads [1]. Public acceptance
of AV technology will depend on deployed AVs being
safer for both their passengers and other road users than
current human-driven vehicles [2]. Therefore regulatory and
operator approval of AVs will require rigorous evidence that
AV accident and particularly fatality rates are lower than
acceptable thresholds.
Kalra and Paddock [3] have shown the infeasibility of a
naive approach to demonstrating the safety of AV systems.
In short, if safety were demonstrated by testing a fixed
AV system configuration in conditions reflecting typical
usage, a fleet of such vehicles would have to be driven
275 million miles (approximately 441 million kilometres)
without a fatality for the probability that the fatality rate for
that AV system was lower than for conventional vehicles
to exceed 95%. Even ignoring the exorbitant cost of such a
process, it is highly unlikely that the AV system software
and hardware could truly be kept static for long enough to
complete such a testing program. Therefore, an alternative
approach is required.
While external stakeholders are likely to be most inter-
ested in the reliability of a system as it currently exists, AV
manufacturers also have a considerable stake in predicting
the reliability of their future AV systems before they are com-
pleted. AV development programs by major manufacturers
have cost over one billion US dollars [4] and taken over a
decade. The profitability of such investments depends on
the time and resources required to build a commercially vi-
able product. Therefore, the ability to estimate future safety
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improvements would allow AV manufacturers to evaluate
whether further investments are financially justifiable.
Evaluating and predicting the reliability of an evolving
software system is a well studied problem. Software relia-
bility growth models (SRGMs) have been developed for the
purpose [5]. SRGMs allow the statistically rigorous estima-
tion of the current and future reliability of software systems
as programming faults are rectified through testing and use.
Given that only a small minority of vehicle accidents are
caused by hardware failures [6], it is plausible that failure
rates of AVs can be modelled using techniques developed
for software systems.
Previous analyses of accident data from on-road AV
test programs have shown the counter-intuitive result that
accident rates have not declined [7] over years of testing and
development. Aside from the very limited sample, this may
be due to the fact that a substantial proportion of accidents
will be attributable to a varying degree to the actions of the
drivers of other vehicles involved. Attributing responsibility
in collisions between vehicles is self-evidently complex and
may render any analysis less valid than might be hoped.
However, the publicly available reports of on-road test-
ing by AV manufacturers to the California Department of
Motor Vehicles [8] provide a very useful proxy metric for
estimating the progress of an under-test AV system. These
reports, as well as listing accidents involving AVs under test,
list each occasion where a disengagement events occurred. A
disengagement event is defined as occuring when a human
backup driver either:
• takes over driving after a warning from the AV’s
systems that they were not able to proceed safely in
accordance with local driving laws.
• takes over driving on their own initiative where they
judged that the AV was not proceeding safely in
accordance with local driving laws.
To achieve full autonomous operation (Levels 4 and 5
according to the widely-adopted SAE taxonomy [9]) the
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2rate of these incidents will have to be reduced to negligible
levels – even if the human backup drivers were ultimately
overzealous in some interventions, customers are unlikely
to accept vehicles that put them in driving situations they
would themselves consider too risky. It is also at least
plausible that the rate of such events is reasonably well
correlated with the rate at which accidents which the AV
system could have prevented would occur in the absence of
the backup driver.
Therefore, the disengagement rate is at least a plausible
initial metric for assessing the reliability of AV systems.
In this paper, we examine:
• if two well-known SRGMs accurately fit reported
disengagement rate data for the two most extensively
tested AV systems
• if the two SRGMs can be used to accurately predict
disengagement rates by modelling using a subset of
earlier data, and comparing the model predictions
with the later data
• which of the two SRGMs is most useful for these
purposes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Software Reliability Modeling
Software reliability is a measure of the frequency of fail-
ures – instances where a software system fails to perform
as specified. More formally, the IEEE Software Reliability
recommended practice [10] defines software reliability as:
1) The probability that software will not cause
the failure of a system for a specified time
under specified conditions.
2) The ability of a program to perform a re-
quired function under stated conditions for
a stated period of time.
For our purposes, the first definition is the relevant one,
though it is typical to describe reliability by measuring the
presence of failures rather than their absence.
A software reliability model (SRM) is therefore a mathe-
matical expression describing the reliability of a system, or
more formally “A mathematical expression that specifies the
general form of the software failure process as a function of
factors such as fault introduction, fault removal, and the
operational environment” [10]. In this context, faults are
defined as the underlying defects in the software system
that are the cause of failures.1
Software Reliability Growth Models (SRGMs) are a sub-
set of SRMs, based on the observation of the distinct reli-
ability characteristics of software-based systems compared
to ones not including software. In hardware reliability mod-
elling, the primary source of failure is physical deterioration,
whereas in software the primary cause of failures is design
faults, which, once fixed, do not recur [11, p. 7]2. There-
fore, software systems often demonstrate a characteristic
1. The relationship between software faults and failures is a complex
one discussed at length in the software engineering literature, but the
subtleties are not pertinent here.
2. to a first approximation; “regression errors” due to poor source
code change management are not uncommon, and bug fixes are often
less than perfect
pattern of reliability, where failures are common in early
testing/use, but as the underlying errors are fixed the rate
of failure drops and reliability improves.
A variety of SRGMs have been proposed, all making
slightly different assumptions about the nature of software
faults, the efficacy of bug fixing, and testing/usage patterns.
Most such models fall into one of two groups, S-shaped and
concave [5], based on the characteristic shape of the model
when plotted. Figure 1 shows an illustrative example of each
model group. The X-axis of the figure represents “time” τ
(which may or may not be simple calendar time, as we will
discuss further) and the Y-axis represents the cumulative
number of failures detected from the commencement of
testing until time τ . As can be seen, in the concave model,
the rate of failure detection is highest at the beginning
of data collection, and decreases as time goes on. In S-
shaped models, failure detection rates initially increase as
the effectiveness of testing improves, before decreasing as
more of the defects in the system are found. In both cases,
the rate of failure detection asymptotically approaches zero
as τ approaches infinity.
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Fig. 1. Concave and S-shaped SRGMs. Representative examples of
concave and s-shaped SRGMs, illustrating how S-shaped SRGMs ini-
tially have a low rate of failure detection which increases then decreases.
Empirical studies of software failure data [5], [12] have
shown that different model classes are better fits for dif-
ferent projects. Ullah, Morisio, and Vetro [12] studied the
performance of a variety of such models using the histories
of real software development projects. They found that the
Musa-Okumoto model (a concave model) and the Gompertz
model (an S-shaped model) fitted empirical data more ac-
curately than other models. Therefore, for this preliminary
study, those two models were selected.
2.1.1 Musa-Okumoto model
The Musa-Okumoto model [13] is a popular concave SRGM.
It is based on the following assumptions:
• that failures occur as a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process
• that the number of failures µ at the start of the
process (τ = 0) is 0.
• that expected failure intensity λ- the rate at which
failures are expected to occur - declines exponentially
3with the number of failures detected (µ). More for-
mally, λ (µ) = λ0e−θµ, where λ0 is the failure inten-
sity at the start of the process, and θ is a parameter
that describes the rate of failure intensity decline.
In the Musa-Okumoto model, the mean value function
- the expected number of failures detected at time τ is
designated µ (τ), and is described by the following function:
µ (τ) =
1
θ
ln (1 + λ0θτ) (1)
2.1.2 Gompertz model
The Gompertz model [14] is an example of an S-shaped
SRGM. Gompertz growth models have been used to predict
growth in a variety of domains, including microbiology as
well as software engineering (need citation). The mean value
function of the Gompertz model is as follows:
µ (τ) = akb
τ
, a > 0, 0 < b < 1, 0 < k < 1 (2)
a is the total number of failures to be “eventually”
detected, and b and k are parameters to be estimated.
3 METHODS
3.1 Data selection
This study uses the publicly available vehicle event reports
from AV manufacturers available from the California De-
partment of Motor Vehicles [8].
These reports, which must be provided to the DMV on
a yearly basis as a condition of the autonomous vehicle
testing permits offered by that state, provide the provide
the following information about each AV manufacturer’s
program:
1) A listing of all the vehicles used in testing.
2) the date, time, and brief description of the reasons
for the disengagement.
3) the total vehicle distance driven in autonomous
mode per calendar month.
4) total vehicle distance driven in autonomous mode
per calendar month for each individual vehicle in
the test program.
Of the 20 AV manufacturers who submitted testing re-
ports for the 2017 calendar year, only two were selected for
analysis: Waymo [15], formerly Google’s autonomous vehi-
cle division, and Cruise Automation [16], the autonomous
vehicle program of General Motors. These two companies
were selected because they have conducted far more on-
road testing in California than the other 18 companies in the
program: Waymo has completed over 1.4 million miles of
testing since commencing in 2014, and Cruise has completed
approximately 141,000 miles of testing since commencing in
2015. The next largest California-based testing program has
completed less than 10,000 miles of on-road testing.
This selection is not intended as a judgement on the
overall maturity and readiness of AV programs, as the other
AV manufacturers may be conducting large-scale testing
on private roads or in other jurisdictions, only that there
is insufficient data in the California data set to evaluate
disengagement event trends for other manufacturers.
3.2 Data preprocessing
In this study, all disengagement events listed in the com-
pany reports were included in the analysis. It is likely that
in some cases, disengagements occurred as a precaution by
the safety driver, and no adverse event would have resulted
if the AV continued in autonomous mode. However, the in-
formation provided in the data set was insufficient to make
such a judgement on whether to exclude any particular
disengagement event on this basis.
When applying SRGMs such as Musa-Okumoto, “time”
can be defined in a number of ways, including “clock time”,
CPU time spent executing the software, or the number of
tests run. In the context of AVs, the distance driven is the
most natural measure of the testing conducted, particularly
given that crash rates are typically quoted in terms of
distance travelled.
Unfortunately, however, the exact cumulative distance
driven at the time of each disengagement event is not
reported in the public data set - only the number of miles
driven by the driverless car fleet each calendar month.
The exact calendar time of each disengagement event is
reported, but there is no information about the total fleet
hours driven up to the time of each disengagement event.
Inspection of the full disengagement event logs and the
accumulated testing suggested that, at least in the early
stages of development, on-road testing was irregular and
conducted for only a small fraction of each calendar month.
This meant that, if calendar time was used as the time
variable in modelling, one of the assumptions of the Musa-
Okumoto model - that disengagements were a random
memoryless Poisson process - did not hold in the data
available.
Therefore, for each AV manufacturer, for each calendar
month in the data set, we calculated:
• The cumulative miles driven by the manufacturer’s
vehicle fleet up to and including that calendar
month; and
• The cumulative number of disengagement events.
3.3 Model parameter estimation
Both the Musa-Okumoto and Gompertz models are param-
eterized, and to apply the model to a given software system
values for these parameters must be estimated. In a random
process, any parameters chosen will usually not result in a
perfect fit, and therefore a criterion that specifies the nature
of the “best” fit is required. The two definitions of best fit
commonly used for this type of estimation in the literature
are maximum likelihood and nonlinear least squares.
Maximum likelihood estimation seeks to choose param-
eters that maximise the likelihood function of the model. The
likelihood function L (θ) of a model with observed data
x is defined as “the probability of the observed data x
considered as a function of θ” [17]. Therefore, a maximum
likelihood estimate chooses the model where the observed
data was most likely to have occurred.
Nonlinear least squares estimation seeks to find param-
eters that minimise the sum of the square of the differences
between the produced data, and the values predicted by the
model.
4In both cases, iterative numerical methods are used to
find parameters that minimise or maximise the relevant
function.
In linear models with errors that are normally dis-
tributed, the best estimate obtained by least squares will also
be the best maximum likelihood estimate, but the model
here is not linear and there is no guarantee the errors are
normally distributed. The existing SRGM literature gener-
ally uses ML modelling where possible to obtain parameter
estimates. Unfortunately, while the likelihood function of
the Musa-Okumoto model is known, the closed forms in
the literature require that the data must be in the form of
intervals between individual events.
As the data was not available in this form, least
squares estimation was used to estimate model parameters
for both the Gompertz and Musa-Okumoto models. The
scipy.optimize.curve_fit function in version 0.19 of
SciPy [18], using Python 3.6.7rc1 on an Ubuntu 18.10 virtual
machine instance, was used for all curve fitting.
curve_fit also estimates a covariance matrix, which
provides variance estimates for the model parameters. The
delta method [19] was used to calculate 95% confidence
intervals for the model.
3.4 Model accuracy assessment metrics
Previous studies comparing the goodness of fit for various
software reliability growth models [12] have used the coef-
ficient of determination (R2) to compare the quality of the
model fitting achieved. While this metric works very well
for comparing linear models, it can give misleading results
when comparing nonlinear models [20]. The most sophisti-
cated comparison metrics for nonlinear models require the
ability to calculate the likelihood functions for those models,
which was not possible given the data available.
Therefore, for this study, the standard error of esti-
mate [21] was used to compare the goodness of fit of the
models. The standard error of estimate is the mean deviation
of the observations from the model prediction. The smaller
the standard error of estimate, the better the model fits the
data.
3.5 Experimental procedure
To compare the usefulness of the two models for AV data,
we adapted the procedure of Ullah et al. [12]. As discussed,
we use the standard error of estimate to compare the good-
ness of model fit, rather than coefficient of determination.
3.5.1 Experiment 1: goodness of fit
To assess which model best fitted the disengagement event
data from each manufacturer, a nonlinear least squares fit
was computed using the entire data set from each AV man-
ufacturer, for both the Musa-Okumoto and the Gompertz
models. The standard error of estimate was computed for
each model.
3.5.2 Experiment 2: accuracy of predictions
To assess which model most accurately predicts disengage-
ment event rates, a nonlinear least squares fit was computed
for the first two-thirds of the points of each data set from the
AV manufacturer, for each model. Both models were then
plotted against the actual data for the entire data set.
The standard error of estimate, and 95% model confi-
dence intervals, were computed for each model.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Experiment 1: goodness of fit
Fig 2 shows the observed cumulative number of disengage-
ment events and kilometres driven, and the least squares
model fit for the Musa-Okumoto and Gompertz models
for the Waymo data set. Visually, the data set contains no
indication of an S-shaped curve. Visually, Musa-Okumoto
model appears to be a reasonably good fit for the data; the
Gompertz model less so. As previously discussed, the use
of nonlinear least squares estimation does not permit the
calculation of confidence intervals for the model parameters,
so there are no error bars on the plot.
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Fig. 2. Best-fit models for disengagement events for Waymo data set.
Fig 3 shows the observed disengagement events and best
fit models for the Cruise data set. In this case, the Musa-
Okumoto model is a far better visual fit than the Gompertz
model. This may be due, in part, to the overrepresentation
of points where the accumulated distance is small in the
model; the least squares estimator weights errors at all
provided data points equally, even if they are not equis-
distributed on the x-axis. Regardless, the visual similarity of
the best-fit Musa-Okumoto model to the observed data is
striking.
Table 1 shows the standard error of the regression for
each model and data set. As would be expected from
the graphs, the standard error of estimate for the Musa-
Okumoto model is lower than for the Gompertz model, for
both data sets.
TABLE 1
Standard error of estimate for SRGMs
Data set
Model Waymo Cruise
Musa-Okumoto 2.501 2.468
Gompertz 5.699 7.553
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Fig. 3. Best-fit models for disengagement events for Cruise data set.
Figures 4 and 5 show 95% confidence intervals for the
Musa-Okumoto model for the Waymo and Cruise datasets
respectively.
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Fig. 4. Musa-Okumoto model fit, with confidence intervals for disen-
gagement events for Waymo data set.
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Fig. 5. Musa-Okumoto model fit, with confidence intervals for disen-
gagement events for GM Cruise data set.
4.2 Experiment 2: prediction
Attempts to find model parameters for a model of first two-
thirds of the data points using the Gompertz model proved
fruitless. SciPy’s curve fitting algorithm was unable to con-
verge to a plausible solution for either data set. Therefore,
we present results for the Musa-Okumoto model only.
Figure 6 shows a plot of actual disengagement events for
Waymo, compared to a Musa-Okumoto model calculated
from the first two-thirds of the monthly data points. Figure 7
shows a similar plot for the Cruise. Points left of the vertical
line were in the first two-thirds of the monthly data points
and were used in the model parameter estimation. Note that
the proportion of the testing kilometres included in each
model differs substantially, as it appears Waymo reduced
the number of testing kilometres driven in California in the
latter part of the data series, where Cruise increased their
own testing. Table 2 shows the standard error of estimate
for the two models.
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Fig. 6. Predictive model for Waymo data set Cumulative disengage-
ment events for the Waymo data set compared to a best-fit model
computed from the first two-thirds of the monthly data points.
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Fig. 7. Predictive model for Cruise data set Cumulative disengagement
events for the Cruise data set compared to a best-fit model computed
from the first two-thirds of the monthly data points.
In both cases, it appears that the actual data is broadly
consistent with the model predictions. The model predicts
6TABLE 2
Standard error of estimate for SRGMs computed from first
two-thirds of monthly data points
Dataset Standard error of estimate
Waymo 2.873
Cruise 2.771
fewer disengagement events than were present in the real
data in the Waymo data set, but more events than actually
occurred in the Cruise data set. It is notable that in both
cases, but particularly for the Cruise dataset, the confidence
intervals are relatively wide compared to the fits with the
full datasets.
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY
There are a number of threats to the validity of this study.
The raw data presented in the paper was collected on
behalf of subsidiaries of large, publicly listed companies,
who face legal sanction if inaccurate or incomplete data was
provided. The calculations performed in this paper were
conducted using the SciPy library, a well-tested, popular
library for performing statistical modelling. The (trivial)
Python code used for the calculations, and the raw data,
is available from (source).
However, there are a number of potential confounding
factors that the data set provides insufficient information to
evaluate. The models assumed that testing and debugging
practices did not change, and that the number of kilometres
accumulated in California testing linearly correlated with
the total testing and debugging effort to date. This is known
not to be the full picture for Waymo. Waymo conducts
testing in a private testing ground [22], performs simulation
experiments of variations of real-world events using fuzz
testing [23], and was in the process of shifting much of its
onroad testing to Arizona towards the end of the reporting
period. Unlike in California, in Arizona, companies are not
required to disclose disengagement events, or accidents.
Fixes for faults found and located through these efforts are
presumably incorporated into the cars tested in California,
but there is little or no public information as to the extent
and timelines of this private testing. While less is known
about the testing program of GM Cruise, they are highly
likely to also be conducting simulation testing, and testing
on private roads.
It is also unknown whether the purpose and scope of
on-road testing changed significantly in the periods covered
by the data sets. It seems likely that the range of driving
conditions in which AV manufacturers would test their
vehicles would be relatively narrow initially, and broaden
considerably over time. This broadened scope would pre-
sumably include higher-risk driving conditions such as un-
favourable weather (AV sensors are known to be affected
by snow [24])), increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic,
and poorer road conditions. If problems are detected in
particular conditions, it is plausible that for a subsequent
period testing will focus on confirming the effectiveness of
those problems, which may affect the disengagement rate
for that period.
The robustness of the estimates is somewhat constrained
by the inability to use the standard technique for parameter
estimation in SRGMs - maximum likelihood estimation.
ML models do no assume that deviations from the model
are normally distributed, and the use of non-standard (in
this domain) estimation techniques increased the risks of
mistakes.
Obviously, with a data set of only two autonomous
vehicle projects, it is unknown whether other projects will
follow a similar reliability growth curve. Nor do the existing
data sets show a complete development life cycle, as neither
vehicle had reached a point where the manufacturer had
sought approval for full autonomous operation without a
safety driver.3 Therefore, it is not clear from the available
data whether these SRGMs can provide accurate predictions
all the way to the very high reliability levels required for safe
commercial operation.
6 DISCUSSION
These results clearly indicate that reported disengagement
events in two large AV test programs can be fitted rea-
sonably accurately to standard software reliability growth
models. While not as accurate, the ability of the models
to predict failure rates is also surprisingly good given all
the uncertainties and confounding factors mentioned above.
The results also demonstrate that confidence intervals for
models can be calculated, allowing upper bounds on dis-
engagement rates, with nominated levels of confidence, can
be calculated, on an evolving system. It is even possible to
estimate how much further testing is required before the
upper bound disengagement rates will be below a desired
threshold.
6.1 Viability of reliability growth modeling in AVs
The application of the Musa-Okumoto SRGM to the AV dis-
engagement data suggests that, contrary to the assumptions
of Kalra and Paddock [3], it may be possible to calculate
mathematically sound estimates of the current and future
failure rates of AVs based on past behaviour of earlier
versions of the system.
Furthermore, rather than trying to model comparatively
rare events – fatalities or accidents – using disengagement
events is a more feasible way to assess the the progress of
an AV project. It should be noted that using self-reported
disengagement events as an mandated threshold criterion
for regulatory approval would be risky, as AV manufactur-
ers might be tempted to modify their software and instruct
their drivers to not disengage in marginal situations.
6.2 Models
For these two programs, the Musa-Okumoto model was a
far better fit to the complete data sets, and was the only
model that (at least with the SciPy’s curve fitting algorithm)
that resulted in a plausible fit when provided with an
incomplete data set. The key assumption of an S-shaped
model is that testers initial efforts will be less effective at
revealing faults than later efforts as they gain experience in
testing the system. The nature of road-based testing, and
3. According to media reports, Waymo plans to launch a fully au-
tonomous taxi services in Phoenix, Arizona, some time in late 2018 [25].
7the nature of the faults reported is not consistent with this
assumption, and the data appears to bear this out.
While the simple Musa-Okumoto model was a good fit
for the data available, it is unlikely to be the last word in
modeling autonomous vehicle failures. Software reliability
growth models model testing as a simple numeric quantity,
but it is an open question as to whether using real-world
testing kilometres travelled is appropriate here given the
multifaceted nature of AV testing programs. According to
Madrigal [26], many of the improvements in Waymo’s AV
program come through their use of simulation, rather than
directly from on-road testing. However, the “interesting”
scenarios they model are often ones identified in disen-
gagement scenarios. As such, it is possible that simulation,
powerful though it is, is ultimately an “amplifier” for real-
world testing. That is, it allows the exploration of a huge
number of variations of failure scenarios, and gives higher
confidence that those failure scenarios will not occur again
when similar conditions are encountered in the real world.
If so, it may well be that real-world testing kilometres
travelled are a reasonable proxy for testing effort, but it
remains an open question that can only be clarified with
more data.
6.3 Data reporting procedure limitations
As noted in threats to validity, the need to use nonlinear
least squares estimation rather than maximum likelihood
modeling has increased the risk of invalid assumptions in
the models. However, modifications to the data reporting
procedure would make it straightforward to compute maxi-
mum likelihood models for disengagement event rates. For
instance, instead of reporting the number of failures per
calendar month and the total distance driven, companies
could report the cumulative distance driven by the test fleet
at the time of each disengagement event.
6.4 Related works
In this context, we should also consider the work of Huang
et al. [27], who observe that testing driverless cars by reflect-
ing real-world driving conditions is not a particularly effi-
cient way to improve or measure reliability. Their approach
is to consider particular driving tasks (in their example,
freeway lane changes), build a statistical model of the key
parameters governing the variance in lane changes, skew
testing (both physical and simulation) heavily to those areas
of the parameter space where failures are likely to occur,
and then use the statistical model in reverse to estimate
real-world failure rates. SRGMs could, in theory, be used
as part of such an approach, as a way to track the decrease
in failure rates in specific tasks. It may also be considered
desirable to conduct a parallel on-road testing replicating
normal driving to validate any Huang-style statistical model
- and using an SRGM on this data would still be useful as a
way to provide ongoing estimates of vehicle failure rates, to
compare with predictions.
Favaro et al [7] examined accident data for the Waymo
program through to 2017, and found a simple linear rela-
tionship between kilometres travelled and cumulative ac-
cidents. They therefore concluded, While accidents are an
important metric, it does not follow that there have been no
improvements in the function of AV systems. Their analysis
does does not take into account that manual intervention
by the human safety drivers is likely to have prevented a
significant number of accidents, and those disengagements,
as shown in this work, have become much rarer over time.
Furthermore, it does not take into account the contribution
to accidents of human drivers that an AV could not reason-
ably be expected to avoid. Favaro et al. also examined the
circumstances of disengagement events in some detail.
The present paper, along with Favaro and others who
have examined the California DMV data, shows the value of
open data sets for enabling research into topics of public im-
portance. However, it also demonstrates the need for expert
advice on exactly what data is collected and reported. If the
advice of statisticians had been sought, it may well be that
cumulative distances driven at the time of disengagement
events would have been included in the data set, making
maximum likelihood estimates straightforward to calculate.
7 CONCLUSION
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Software reliability growth models (SRGMs) closely
fit trends in disengagement events in the two most
extensive public road AV test programs in the Cal-
ifornia DMV public data set, and can therefore be
used to rigorously estimate the current disengage-
ment rate.
2) Software reliability growth models are reasonable
predictors of trends in disengagement events in
these two programs. This could allow an AV manu-
facturer or other interested party to predict the ex-
pected future disengagement rate, given a specified
amount of continued testing and development.
3) Confidence intervals for model parameters and the
model values can be calculated, enabling the estima-
tion of the present or future probability that disen-
gagement rates are lower than a desired threshold.
4) A representative concave SRGM, Musa-Okumoto, is
a better fit to the data than a representative S-shaped
SRGM, the Gompertz model.
5) The mandated format of the California DMV data
set does not permit the straightforward use of
maximum likelihood model estimation, which is a
more robust way of estimating the parameters of an
SRGM.
These contributions are of value not only to developers
of AV systems, who may be able to use SRGMs to evaluate
the present state of an AV system, but also to estimate the
time and resources required to achieve safety benchmarks
before those resources are invested. They also have impli-
cations for regulators, as it offers the potential for rigorous
estimates of AV system safety without requiring infeasible
amounts of testing.
There are many potential extensions to this preliminary
work. As more AV programs mature, an obvious followup
is to examine whether the disengagement events for those
programs are also effectively modelled using SRGMs. With
more data, it should also be possible to consider more
rigorously whether the Musa-Okumoto model is really the
8most applicable to AV road testing data, or if one or more of
the many other concave SRGMs is a better fit. It would also
be beneficial to investigate integrating the use of SRGMs
into the weighted modelling/testing approach of Huang et
al. [27].
As well as ML models, There are other candidate tech-
niques for parameter estimation and calculation of con-
fidence intervals, which may be applicable to this data.
Bootstrapping [28] can be used to calculate variance for
certain types of time-dependent data. Bootstrapping, and
other resampling techniques, may permit more accurate
confidence intervals to be calculated on the relatively small
data sets available here.
The relationship between disengagement events and
accidents, the metric of ultimate concern, is also a topic
worthy of much further work. While the question of as-
signing responsibility in accidents is knotty, a working
understanding must be found if regulators are to fairly
assess the safety of AV systems without unfairly penalizing
them for actions of others that human drivers would not be
held accountable for. This multifaceted problem will require
an interdisciplinary solution, with the social sciences and
humanities having at least as much to contribute as science
and engineering.
While this paper has concentrated on land-based au-
tonomous vehicles, other types of robotic vehicles face sim-
ilar concerns. There is currently considerable commercial
interest in developing uncrewed, fully autonomous drones
for package delivery, and much larger autonomous aircraft
for passenger transport [29]. In both cases, there is a need
for reliability estimation and prediction, and it is plausible
that SRGMs will be useful for this purpose. Therefore,
performing a similar analysis to this paper with a drone
failure dataset is an opportunity for future work with near-
term real-world implications.
In the race to commercialize what is expected to be ex-
ceedingly valuable technology, questionable safety practices
have been revealed [30] in some AV development programs.
Simply trusting assertions that an AV is sufficiently safe
is unlikely to, and should not, satisfy the public as to the
readiness of an AV system for production use. Whatever the
ultimate statistical basis of demonstrating the reliability and
safety of autonomous vehicles, it is clear that an explicit, rig-
orous and statistically sound approach to safety assessment
by regulators is required. This paper is, hopefully, a small
contribution towards that.
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